Descriptives
. Survey language(s), sample sizes, proportion of females, mean and standard deviation of age, SVO slider means for each country. %F = proportion of females, SVOangle = mean score SVO slider scale.
Countries
Language 
Multilevel models
In this section, we provide the full report of the results of the model. First, we run the model with only the Contrast 1 and
Knowledge variables (Table S2) , then we added in the model a measure of social value orientation (Table S3 ) and finally we added the gender variable (Table S4) . Note. Contrast1 = ingroup vs outgroup + stranger conditions; Knowledge = common vs unilateral knowledge conditions; Rule of law = index of authority of laws within a country; SVO = measure of social value orientations; Belief hell = proportion of people believing in hell within a country; Gender = gender variable; GINI = index of income inequality within a country; GDP per capita = gross domestic product per capita within a country; Parasite stress = historical disease prevalence index; Protestant = proportion of protestants within a country; Religiosity attendance = frequency of church attendance within a country; Market competitiveness = level of productivity of a country; Government effectiveness = ability of the government to implement sound policies; × = interaction term. We compared several models with other models through the Akaike information criteria and the Bayesian information criteria. The model with the best fit was always the one that did not include the cultural variables. Nonetheless, we report above a model that includes all the variables investigated. The model does not include Taiwan since most of the cultural data were missing for this country. 
Payment models

Knowledge and reputational concern
We tested if the common vs unilateral knowledge manipulation affects reputational concern in an experimental study conducted on Mturk (N = 687). The study was a 2 (ingroup vs outgroup partner group membership; using minimal group paradigm) × 2 (High cohesion vs nolow cohesion) × 2 (common vs unilateral knowledge) between-subjects experimental design. Our dependent measure was cooperative behavior in one-shot prisoner's dilemma task. We used a measure of reputational concern that has been validated in previous research (1, 
Additional analyses
Multilevel models assuming a binomial distribution
In addition to the models presented in our paper, we ran additional analyses that consider the discrete and censored nature of the dependent variables. In this section, we present multilevel generalized linear models on trust and trustor expectations, assuming the data are binomially distributed. These models were run in R with the lme4 package (3). 
The multilevel generalized linear models of Contrast 1 and Knowledge predicting trust behavior and trustor expectations.
Fixed effects on
Tobit models
We further analyzed Tobit model for each country to observe whether we could replicate the findings reported in our meta-analysis. To run these models, we used the software R and the package censreg (4). Significance level: † <.10; *<.05; **<.001
Between-subject effect of knowledge on trust behavior
To rule out the possibility that the effect of knowledge on trust was not due to the withinsubjects structure of our design, we rerun the analysis only considering the first decision of each participant and test whether a between-subject manipulation of common versus unilateral knowledge had a significant effect on trust behavior. The model was a multilevel model where countries was a random factor. The final sample size for this analysis consisted of 1,241
participants. The results are consistent with the analyses using the entire data and the within- 
Instructions Informed Consent Form Introduction
This is a study on decision making. The study is being conducted by Professor James Liu at Massey University and Professor Daniel Balliet at Free University of Amsterdam.
We aim at testing some theories about decision making. For this reason, we kindly ask you to answer the survey seriously.
Procedures
The purpose of this research is to examine decision making in different situations. You will interact with some other participants in several decision making tasks. Then, you will be asked to answer some questions about the decision making tasks. We estimate it will take no more than 25 minutes to complete the study.
Risks/Discomforts
There are no anticipated risks for participating in this study.
Benefits
A potential benefit of participating is that you might learn something about decision-making that you might not have been aware of before. You may also be assigned to make a decision involving or being affected by someone from another country.
Confidentiality
All of your answers will be kept confidential. Any information you provide will be stored indefinitely on the encrypted and password protected site, and on password-protected computers only. When presenting the results of this research, we will in no way focus on individual participants' responses and will instead present the findings in summary form. You will not be asked for information that would enable you to be identified personally.
This research is supported by a grant from the Department of Defense-anonymous data can be shared with their qualified personnel.
Compensation
Independent Variable:
[payment condition only in United Kingdom and South Korea] 15. Depending on you and others' decisions in the decision-making tasks, you will have an opportunity to earn up to $$ dollars.
[no payment condition] You are playing for Monetary Units, a fictional currency that gauges how well you are doing at the decision-making task. These Monetary Units are meaningful in the context of the experiment, but have no value in the real world. lmer(Trust behavior~ Contrast1*knowledge+Contrast1*Rule_of_Law_s+Contrast1*SVO_angle+Contrast1*Belief_hel l_s+Contrast1*newGENDER+GINI_s+GDPcapita_2015_s+Contrast1*Parasite_stress_s+Contra st1*Protestant_s+Contrast1*Religiosity_attendance_s+Contrast1*market_competitiveness_s+Co ntrast1*Government_effectiveness_s+(ContrastContrast1|Country), data=Tdata)
R codes multilevel models
Models
Correlation between trust and trustworthiness
Previous research found medium correlation between trust behavior and trustworthiness. Yamagishi and colleagues (5) found a correlation of 0.52 while Peysakhovich, Nowak and Rand (6) found a correlation of 0.49. In our study, the correlation between trust and trustworthiness was 0.27.
